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Abstract: Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, 
according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been 
criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of 
action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and 
suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for 
intellectualism is that Aristotle explicitly states reason cannot set the goals of action. The key problem for 
anti-intellectualism is that he also holds that the soul’s rational part must guide and prescribe over the non-
rational part. I propose indirect intellectualism, a promising middle path. 
Keywords: Aristotle, action, practical rationality, reason, intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, character, 
deliberation. 
 
Resumen: La interpretación de la teoría de la acción de Aristóteles ha tendido recientemente hacia una 
postura intelectualista, según la cual la razón está a cargo de establecer los fines de las acciones. Un 
resurgimiento del anti-intelectualismo, según el cual establecer los fines es tarea del carácter y no de la razón, 
ha puesto esta postura bajo crítica. Este ensayo sostiene que ninguna de las dos interpretaciones puede dar 
cuenta suficiente de las complejidades de la teoría de Aristóteles, y sugiere un camino intermedio que 
combina las fortalezas de ambas, evitando a la vez sus dificultades. El problema crucial del intelectualismo 
es que Aristóteles asevera explícitamente que la razón no puede establecer los fines de la acción. El 
problema crucial del anti-intelectualismo es que él también asevera que la parte racional del alma debe guiar 
y gobernar la parte irracional. Bosquejo aquí el intelectualismo indirecto, una propuesta intermedia 
prometedora. 
Palabras clave: Aristóteles, acción, racionalidad práctica, razón, intelectualismo, anti-intelectualismo, 
carácter, deliberación. 
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Aristotle says that animals are agents, and also that only humans are.1 To avoid contradiction there 
must be two senses of agency at play: ‘broad’ agency, common to animals and humans, and ‘narrow’ 
agency, proper to human adults. So the question arises: what makes human adult agency distinct from 
that of animals and children? Perhaps the latter lack, but the former have, logos (e.g. Pol.I.2.1253a9–18) 
and can use reasoning (logismos) in action production (EE.II.8.1224a28-30). Thus, rationality seems a 
clear distinguishing feature of human agency. This intellectualist interpretation is prevalent in 
contemporary scholarship, but an anti-intellectualist challenge has recently emerged: although only 
humans have reason, non-rational cognition (of the kind we share with animals, i.e. perception and 
phantasia) still governs the starting-point of human action, i.e. the setting of goals.2 While the recent 
charge against the intellectualist orthodoxy has received mixed responses,3 it has renovated the debate 
about Aristotle’s agency theory. 
This essay argues against both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist views: neither can do justice 
to all of Aristotle’s key claims about agency. The essay (1) characterizes the principles of animal agency, 
and tests whether intellectualists or anti-intellectualists can successfully explain human agency. First, 
(2) after assessing prominent intellectualist accounts, it becomes apparent that they cannot 
accommodate solid textual evidence according to which the human soul’s non-rational part sets the 
goals, and the rational part sets the things relative to the goal. Further, (3) recent anti-intellectualism is 
unable to explain how the rational soul can prescribe over its non-rational counterpart. This calls for (4) 
outlining a new interpretation that preserves the merits and avoids the pitfalls of both traditional views. 
 
1. Principles of animal agency 
In the Aristotelian texts, actions are primarily locomotions. The discussions of animal movement 
(DA.III.7–11; MA.6–11) treat ‘acting’ (prattein) and ‘moving’ (kineisthai) largely interchangeably, and 
‘action’ (praxis) refers to an animal’s locomotive pursuit or avoidance of some object. Aristotle calls 
locomotion ‘voluntary’ and labels it ‘action’ whenever the principle of motion is internal to the mover.4 
                                                
1 In both EE.II.6–8 and the central books (common to both Ethics; particularly EN.VI.2) Aristotle deprives animals and 
children of agency. But he grants it in EN.III.1–2, and at least implicitly throughout MA and in DA.III.9–11 (cf. Phys.II.8 
199a20-ff). 
2 See works by Moss (2011; 2012). 
3 Grönroos (2015), Hämäläinen (2015), Jiménez (2015), Liu (2012), Meyer (2016). 
4 See also EN.III.1.1111a22–23; III.5.1113b19-21; cf. EE.II.6. 
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The crucial notion of a ‘principle of motion’ gets expressed in several different ways. For instance, 
agents are called kurioi of their actions, and our actions are said to be eph’ hēmīn. Aristotle gives the 
word ‘kurios’ (originally meaning ‘master’ or ‘lord’) an abstract turn as ‘commander’ or ‘controller’. Thus, 
we are kurioi of our actions in the sense that we are in control of them. On the other hand, Aristotle 
claims that X is eph’ hēmīn, or up to us, meaning that it is up to us to do X or not to do X, i.e. that 
whether X happens or not depends on our causal influence in the world.5 
Thus agents are entities capable of producing bodily movements of which they themselves are 
principles. Such movements can hence be called ‘actions’, and insofar as they are generated by inner 
principles, they are voluntary and up to us. Thus, the difference between human and animal agency 
should depend on the principles of motion proper to each. 
 
1.1. The ‘faculty of desire’ as a principle of animal motion 
In a crucial passage, Aristotle claims there are two key principles of animal motion: cognition and 
desire. 
 
We see that the things that move the animal are cognition, phantasia, decision, wish, and appetite. But all 
of these come down to cognition [noūs] and desire [orexis]. For phantasia and perception take the same 
place as cognition, since they are all discerning faculties [kritika], although they differ from one another in 
the ways we have mentioned elsewhere. On the other hand, wish, spiritedness, and appetite are all desire, 
and decision is common to both cognition and desire; hence the things that move primarily are the object 
of desire and the object of cognition. (MA.5.700b17–24) 
 
The faculties of perception, phantasia, and intellect are all grouped under the label ‘discerning faculties’ 
(kritika) because they are all cognitive in a broad sense of the term: they allow animals to discern 
(krinein) the world’s entities. So for all animals a cognitive, discerning faculty is one of the principles of 
                                                
5 At least since Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato, scholars have discussed at length whether Aristotle was an indeterminist 
or a compatibilist, whether he endorsed some version of the principle of alternate possibilities, and in general what his 
position was regarding the free will–determinism debate (see Gauthier & Jolif (1970, 217–220), Taylor (2006, 166), and 
Destrée (2011) for discussion and references). And yet, no Aristotelian concept is clearly analogous to ‘will’, ‘freedom’ or 
‘determinism’, so it may be better to avoid forcing such notions and problems onto his texts; otherwise it may generate more 
distortion than clarity. I focus here on Aristotle’s own way of dealing with the issue he explicitly cared about, namely why it 
is that we can consider ourselves to be in control (kurioi) of our actions. 
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action.6 The same goes for desire: animals can have desires for simple, immediate objects (i.e. ‘appetites’ 
or epithumiai), or more complex desires (i.e. ‘wishes’ or boulēseis, desires implying reason), but in any 
case some kind of motivational process must play a role in explaining why they move. Hence cognition 
and desire are principles of action, inner sources of animal motion.7 
Now, these capacities are not independent; cognition and desire are intrinsically linked by 
pleasure: all animals who have perception have desire, Aristotle holds, because perception implies the 
ability to discern pleasure from pain, pleasant from painful objects; and if an animal perceives these, 
then it has the most basic form of desire: appetite (DA.II.3.414b1–6). So pleasure and pain are 
perceptual experiences, and vice-versa, perception can reveal objects as pleasant or painful. Therefore, 
perceptions (and the phantasiai that follow them) are motivational: they can direct the animal towards 
certain objects or away from others. Cognition moves the animal according to its nature: 
 
Taste [belongs to all animals] because of nutrition. For by means of it they discern [diakrinei] the pleasant 
and the painful concerning nutrition, so that they flee from the latter and pursue the former […]. 
(Sensu.1.436b15–17) 
 
Perceptual objects appear as pleasant or painful, i.e. as worth pursuing or avoiding, and thereby also as 
good or bad. In other words, goodness and badness, insofar as they coincide with pleasure and pain, are 
also perceptible properties of objects. ‘Perceiving something as good’ does not require intellectual 
cognition; it just means that in perception it is revealed as worth being pursued; as to-be-sought, or to-
be-done—that is, as pleasurable. The argument for taste applies to the other sensory modalities: if an 
animal is to find nutrition and preservation by moving, then it needs senses that guide it toward 
naturally pleasant things, and away from naturally painful objects (Sensu.1.436b18–437a2).  
Thus, pleasure links animal cognition and desire toward the pursuit or avoidance of pleasant or 
painful objects. So the sensory, volitional, and motor capacities work together. This seems to be what 
Aristotle means by claiming that perception, desire, and motion are identical in activity, but different in 
                                                
6 Concerning ‘phantasia’, I will merely rely on the widely accepted view that it allows animals (humans included) to 
experience previously perceived objects while not perceptually present. See Nussbaum (1978, essay 5); Frede (1992); 
Labarrière (1997); Schofield (2011); Moss (2012); Carbonell (2013). 
7 I use ‘cognition’ to translate the cognate words noūs, noēsis, and dianoia, which Aristotle uses interchangeably in action-
theoretic contexts. However, broadly construed, ‘cognition’ includes all discerning capacities (reason, phantasia, and 
perception); while in a narrower sense it is a specific discerning faculty distinct from perception and phantasia. 
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being (DA.III.7.431a8–14). These capacities, though definitionally different, constitute a functional 
unity whose different aspects are always co-activated, and which Aristotle sometimes calls “the faculty 
of desire [to orektikon]”.8 Whenever this complex faculty causes the animal’s motions, we can say that 
the principle of motion is internal to the animal. 
 
1.2. Natural dispositions as principles of animal motion 
But one more element is missing. For although Aristotle claims that there is only one mover, namely 
the faculty of desire (to orekton), he goes on to say that the first mover is not said faculty but “the good 
itself”, the external object of desire. Thus, “the unmoved mover is the good attainable in action, and the 
mover that is moved is the faculty of desire” (DA.III.10.433b15–17). The object of desire seems 
therefore to be the first principle of action, its presence (sensed through perception or imagined 
through phantasia) being what triggers the faculty of desire’s activation. If so, the first principle seems 
to be external to the agent (cf. Labarrière). No movement would be initially originated by the agent’s 
internal principles, and animals would therefore not be agents: the faculty of desire merely reacts to the 
object’s presence. 
However, what moves the animal is not the object as such, but the object as pleasant or as painful. 
And the object is not pleasant or painful in itself, but only in an animal’s discerning experience of it. In 
fact, what makes a certain animal cognize a given object as pleasant or painful is largely established by 
nature, since “what is in accordance with nature is pleasant; and each animal pursues that which is 
pleasant in accordance with nature” (HA.VIII.1.589a2–9). So rather than the external object, the 
principle of motion should be identified with the animal’s natural dispositions of practical perception. 
They determine which objects become objects of desire by appearing pleasant or painful for each 
animal in accordance with its organic functions.9 
Thus, the principles of animal agency are its “faculty of desire” and its natural cognitive 
dispositions. Whenever these two principles explain the animal’s motion, such motion is an action, and 
the animal an agent. Now, what distinguishes the principles of animal agency from those of human 
adult agency? The next two sections examine the two dominant ways of answering that question.  
                                                
8 Whiting (2002). 
9 Further evidence for this is that the same perceptual object can be pleasant or unpleasant at different times, depending on 
the animal’s situation: “the smells [related to nutrition] are pleasant when we are hungry, but to those who are satiated and 
require nothing they are not pleasant” (De sensu 5.433b22–23). 
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2. Assessing intellectualism about human agency 
Aristotle mentions many features that make humans unique: we are the only animal that has not only 
memory, but also recollection (HA.I.1); humans are the most imitative animals, and learn their first 
lessons through imitation (Poet.I.4); human sight, hearing, and smell are comparatively 
underdeveloped, but our senses of taste and touch are the most accurate of all; and this makes us the 
most intelligent [phronimotaton] animal (DA II.9). Only humans take pleasure in smells that are not 
related to food, like those of flowers (Sensu.5). Man has the smoothest skin because, in proportion to 
size, the human male emits more semen than any other animal (HA.VII.2). The list goes on.10 But 
what among these features makes us more complex agents? 
Here is a common answer: if we add many of these specific traits (like our capacity to recall past 
events, great imitative skills, and superior senses of taste and touch), they lead to the claim that we are 
the animal that has reason (logos) and calculation (logismos).11 We may safely say that a key distinctive 
feature of humans is the possession and use of reason in action production. 
But what exactly is reason’s role in human agency? This is where debate begins. Intellectualists 
claim that reason, among other things, determines the goals of human action. Anti-intellectualists hold 
that goal-setting does not belong to reason, but to non-rational faculties. This section assesses the 
merits of different versions of intellectualism, by first (§2.1) distinguishing different functions that can 
be assigned to practical reason, and then (§2.2) discussing the merits and limitations of diverse 
intellectualist positions. 
 
2.1. Varieties of intellectualism 
Aristotle claims multiple times that the non-rational part of the soul determines the goals of action, 
whereas reason is in charge of establishing only “the things toward the goal” (more on this below). 
Thus reason’s realm of operation differs according to the interpretation of the phrase “things toward 
the goal”. These are three of the most influential interpretations of practical reason’s functions: 
Instrumental function — The most restricted interpretation of “things toward the goal” takes it 
to refer simply to the means required for the goal. This gives reason the merely instrumental function of 
identifying steps necessary to achieve an end. Such interpretation can been called ‘Humeanism’, since 
                                                
10 See Leunissen (2012, 513–520) for a comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s views on human uniqueness. 
11 E.g. DA.III.3.428a21–24, III.10; EN.I.7.1097b33–1098a5; EE.II.8; Pol.I.2.1253a9–10, VII.13.1332b5. 
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reason turns out to be little more than an assistant for non-rational goal-setting processes.12 
Specification function — More possibilities open up if “things towards the goal” includes more 
than just means. An influential line of interpretation holds that the goals that character specifies are 
rather abstract (e.g. ‘happiness’, ‘doing well’, ‘the fine’ or ‘the noble’), and therefore reason must not 
only establish the means, but also determine what counts as attaining the goal in each practical 
situation—what counts as doing well, or as a fine and noble action, here and now. Thus, practical 
reason’s role is not solely instrumental, but also specificatory: the goal’s specifics are determined by 
deliberation. Interpreters have pointed to this function of practical reason as substantiating 
intellectualism about goal-setting.13 
Coordination function — Reason can also play the role of assessing a given goal by contrasting it 
to the agent’s other goals: whether it fits with her overall conception of the good, whether it is 
preferable to competing goals, or whether seeking it would generate negative long-term consequences. 
If reason determines that a given goal is not in accordance with one’s broader practical concerns, then 
the agent can override it. This interpretation gives reason a coordination role, which allows the agent to 
lead a consistent and unified life, responsive to the general concerns and values purportedly established 
by character: Since “the eligibility of a target […] is tested by deliberation” (Price 152–153), reason 
enables humans to exert more control over their actions than other animals, and may even be said to 
determine which goals are pursued: thus intellectualism can also be defended via reason’s coordinating 
function.14 
These descriptions of Aristotelian practical reason are not incompatible. In fact, we may stack 
all these functions together and argue that human agency differs from animal agency due to the greater 
control afforded by practical reason’s three functions. Reason receives a somewhat indefinite 
motivational input from the agent’s character, and structures it by making it specific, rendering it 
consistent with broader goals and plans (or override it if inconsistent), and providing a specific set of 
steps to take toward achievement. All of these features are unique to humans, since they are different 
uses of calculation (logismos) and deliberation (boulē), capacities absent from all other animals. For 
                                                
12 Humeanism is not often endorsed, but sometimes mentioned as a relevant dialectical opponent. For a defence see 
Fortenbaugh (1964); for discussion, Moss (2012; 2014). 
13 Wiggins (1975), Irwin (1975), and McDowell (1998) have defended influential versions of this view. 
14 Price (2011) and Broadie (1991) give reason a coordinating role. See also Wiggins (1975, 45) and Gómez Espíndola 
(2015, 195). 
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them, the appearance of an object as good or bad immediately generates a desire, which leads 
immediately and invariably to action; but human capacities for rational deliberation and calculation 
stand in between desire and action, allowing us to not act even in the presence of an apparent good. It is 
truly up to us (and not up to some innate natural disposition) whether an action occurs or not. All of 
this supports intellectualism: 
 
[H]uman beings are special among animals in having a capacity for articulable thought. Purposive 
behaviour in brutes is an immediate response to an opportunity for gratification of non-rational 
motivational impulses […]. The peculiarly human capacity for thought allows for purposiveness without 
that immediacy; thought can mediate gaps between project and execution. (McDowell 23) 
 
2.2. The problem with intellectualism: the division of labour 
Two of the three main functions of practical rationality (specification and coordination) seem to 
support the intellectualist claim that reason can determine the goals of action. But there is an obstacle, 
a well-documented claim in Aristotle’s extant texts: 
 
(DL) The Division of Labour 
Character, and not reason, sets the goal of human action. Reason must take the goals set by character as its 
starting points. 
 
In other words, reason cannot directly control the appearance of the good (i.e. the appearance of objects 
as pursuable or avoidable): nothing reason cannot make something appear good if character did not 
already present it as good. Reason can, of course, present something as a good means to something else, 
or as a specification of an already given end, but those rational appearances, however important, are 
strictly dependent on prior character-based, non-rationally-determined appearances of the good. If so, 
then reason cannot use its aforementioned functions to control the first principle of our actions. 
The remainder of this section (§2.2.1) summarizes the textual evidence in favour of DL, and 
(§2.2.2) shows that current versions of intellectualism cannot accommodate DL. 
 
2.2.1. The evidence for DL: Goal setting is out of reason’s reach 
Reason’s three functions are applications of deliberative and calculative capacities, i.e. of logismos. But 
[i] practical reasoning cannot provide its own starting points. And since those starting points are goals, 
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[ii] deliberation cannot be about goals, but only about things toward the goals. Moreover, [iii] goals are 
determined not by reasoning, but by habituation and character. 
[i] Aristotle claims that there is no logismos of theoretical or practical starting points. He asks 
whether virtue produces the goal (τὸν σκοπὸν) or the things toward the goal (τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν), 
and replies: “We posit the goal, because there is no argument [sullogismos] or reasoning [logos] of it. 
Rather, it must be presupposed like a starting point.” And after an analogy between hypotheses in 
theoretical reasoning and goals in practical reasoning, he concludes: “Therefore, if either virtue or 
reason is the cause of all correctness, and reason is not the cause, then virtue will be the cause of the 
correctness of the goal, but not of the correctness of the things toward the goal”.15 These remarks fit 
nicely with the view of of reason as a mediator between goal and action, but also imply that reason 
cannot establish its own starting point: the goal. 
[ii] Moreover, as Aristotle goes on to argue in the next few lines, decision (prohairesis) is 
concerned only with things toward the goal, but is never concerned with the goal itself (EE.1227b38–
39; cf. EN.III.2.1111b26–29). Decision, itself a product of deliberation,16 can have only the things 
toward the goal as its object, because, as Aristotle repeatedly claims, “we deliberate not about the goals 
but about the things toward the goals”.17 So practical reasoning is about the things toward the goals 
rather than about goals themselves. But if not through reason, then how are goals determined?  
[iii] The non-rational part of the soul determines goals because it is in charge of pleasure and 
pain,18 on the one hand, and of habits and character, on the other. As seen above (§1.1), an animal’s 
natural dispositions quite rigidly determine its tendency to experience things as pleasant or painful via 
perception and phantasia. But human innate dispositions are much less definitive. Our initial natural 
dispositions are similar to those of other animals, but our practical perception can be largely re-shaped 
through habituation, so that we end up being pleased or pained by the things that we get used to being 
pleased or pained by, and enjoy the activities that become familiar to us through repetition.19 We are 
also born with natural dispositions, and to that extent the souls of children “do not differ at all, so to 
                                                
15 EE.II.11.1227b22–36. Cf. EN.VI.12.1144a7–9; VI.13.1145a4–6; X.8 1178a16–19. 
16 EN III.2.1112a13–17, III.3.1113a9–12. 
17 EN.III.3.1112b11–16. Cf. 1112b32–34; EE.II.10.1226b10–12; 1227a6–13. 
18 Cf. EN.II.3; EE.II.2; II.4. 
19 For a detailed account of habituation see Bermúdez (2016). For a contemporary account of habitual and skilled action, 
see Bermúdez (2017). 
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speak”, from the souls of animals (HA.588a32–b2).20 But while their natural dispositions provide 
animals with sufficient cognitive adaptation to their environments, human innate dispositions are quite 
deficient: we are born less hard-working and more pleasure-loving than is good for us.21 Thus we need 
habituation processes that build our character and shape our phantasia of the good. Therefore, instead 
of natural dispositions, it is our character which determines our cognitive reactions to the practical 
world.22 
Moreover, character determines not only which things one loves and hates, but also whether 
one listens to the voice of reason or simply lives in accordance with one’s passions—and most people 
could not care less for the voice of reason (EN.X.9.1179b23–31). Arguments do not affect most 
people’s actions, because they were not habituated to the use of practical reason. 
In sum, DL is supported by at least three strong lines of textual evidence: the starting points of 
practical reasoning cannot be obtained via reasoning; practical reasoning (i.e. deliberation) is not about 
goals but only about things toward the goals; our phantasiai of the good are set by the character-
building processes of habituation, and only those habituated into rational activity can understand 
reasons and act accordingly. 
 
2.2.2. Intellectualism is incompatible with DL 
Anyone with strong intellectualist intuitions (and that includes most Aristotle scholars) would be 
unhappy with the way this is going. If reason does not play a role in it, then goal-setting seems an 
entirely unintelligent matter, determined by the blind mechanism of habituation. This kind of anti-
intellectualism seems to turn Aristotle’s ethical texts themselves into superfluous exercises. Aren’t those 
texts largely dedicated to rationally establishing the goals of human life? Why would Aristotle have 
dedicated such theoretical effort to a task his own theory renders impossible? These are serious 
concerns that anti-intellectualism must face (§3). But first, several forms of intellectualism must be put 
                                                
20 Children have natural dispositions toward virtuous traits like justice, bravery or temperance (EN.VI.13 1144b1–17), and 
they share these initial dispositions with animals, to the point that Aristotle attributes phronēsis and other virtue-related 
terms to animals that display exceptional capacities. See Lennox (1999, 16–ff.) and López Gómez (2009) for discussion. 
21 EE.II.5.1222a36–38; Pol.VII.13.1332a39–b3. Not all humans have the same innate natural dispositions: they vary in 
accordance with bodily structure and geography (see Pol.VII.7.1327b18–38; cf. Leunissen 2012). 
22 See also III.3.1112b11–16; 1112b33–34; VII.8.1151a15–19; X.8.1178a16–19; EE.II.10.1226b9–10; 1227a7–8; 
II.11.1227b22–25. For discussion see Moss (2012). 
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to the test. Despite its popularity, intellectualism is indeed a difficult position to hold. After all, in its 
strictest form, “the intellectualist case requires that an agent can form a conception of goodness through 
reasoning without appeal to values already desired by the agent. The idea is that the conception so 
formed produces desires in the agent rather than reflecting desires she already has” (Grönroos).  
Such radical intellectualism is very much at odds with the textual evidence for DL (§2.2.1). But many 
scholars have argued for subtler forms of intellectualism: reason may significantly constitute the goals 
that character only very vaguely establishes, via its specification and coordination functions. I now 
examine three differently extreme versions of intellectualism: (A) that through its goal-specification 
function reason constitutes those goals; (B) that wish, being a specifically rational kind of desire, allows 
us to set fully rational goals; and (C) that the intellectual capacity called noûs can grasp practical 
starting-points. 
 
(A) Specification as constitution 
Given reason’s specification function, intellectualists can argue that, beyond determining goal-extrinsic 
details (like means or consistency relations among them), reason also determines goal-intrinsic features, 
i.e. what exactly the goal is in particular situations. They know that this implies rejecting Aristotle’s 
explicit division of labour between character and reason. And they are prepared to do just that, by 
considering DL a consequence of unfortunate phrasing, or an outright mistake on Aristotle’s part. 
Thus, McDowell (30) claims Aristotle risks obscuring his own view with DL. Irwin considers them “at 
least misleading” (576) because “a wise man’s grasp of the end is the result of his deliberation”, and so 
“Aristotle is wrong to claim that there is no reasoning about ethical first principles” (578).23 
To justify DL’s dismissal, specification-intellectualists often argue that character-set goals are 
too vague, and therefore rational calculation must turn them into something concrete. Thus for Wiggins 
“the problem is not to see what will be causally efficacious in bringing [the goal] about, but to see what 
really qualifies as an adequate and practically realizable specification of what would satisfy this want” 
(38). Given the extreme vagueness of character’s goals, practical reasoning must step in to actually 
“determine the content of the correct conception of living well” (McDowell 27; cf. Irwin 572). 
But one must ask: are character-determined goals so vague as to require deliberation to acquire 
some minimally specific content? This cannot be right.24 First, Aristotle compares the practical starting 
                                                
23 See also Cooper (1975, 64); Frede (2013, 23). 
24 Following Price (2011). 
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points with those of the theoretical sciences. The latter must be sufficiently defined to make subsequent 
deductive processes possible: the content of geometric axioms, definitions, and postulates must be 
specific enough to make all of Euclid’s theorems deducible. Likewise, habituation into a certain way of 
acting should give agents starting points powerful enough to produce corresponding actions.  
Further, Aristotle’s examples of practical starting points are often much less vague than 
‘happiness’, ‘doing well’, or ‘the fine and the noble’. In discussing DL, Aristotle claims that the doctor 
does not deliberate about whether to heal, or the gymnast about whether to be in shape—healing and 
being in shape playing the role of deliberation’s starting points (EE.II.11.1227b22–30; cf. 
EN.III.3.1112b12–16). Earlier on (1227a13–15) Aristotle mentioned wealth and pleasure as potential 
starting points. If wealth, pleasure, healing, etc. count as character-determined goals, the view that 
reason must specify character’s overly-vague goals loses steam. Of course, there is still a lot of 
specification to do to take the broad goal of pleasure and turn it into a particular action, but the goal’s 
main content is already there when reason steps in. This is actually good news: since we do not have to 
engage in outright rejection of solid textual evidence in order to deal with DL. For the evidence 
suggests that reason, even in its specificatory role, does not constitute the goal’s content, but rather 
“merely makes explicit what is already contained in the appearance, and thus in no way affects what 
goal we pursue (although it makes all the difference to how we pursue it)” (Moss 155). 
Intellectualists may reply that some passages explicitly endorse intellectualism, e.g.: “it seems it 
is proper of the phronimos to deliberate finely about the things that are good and convenient for him, 
not piecemeal […], but with respect to the good life in general” (EN.VI.5.1140a25–28). But this is a 
report of someone else’s view in a dialectical passage (hence the “it seems”), and so cannot be taken at 
face value. Even if it is, one may argue that “the things that are good and convenient” refer to the 
things toward the goal.  
Consider then this: “the good deliberator without qualification is he who is skilful in aiming at 
[stochastikos] what is best for the human being in accordance with reasoning” (EN.VI.7.1141b12–14), 
which seems to connect deliberating well with properly determining the goal. But ‘being good at 
aiming at’ a target is different from determining the target itself. In fact, the target must be already 
sufficiently determined before someone can successfully aim at it.  
There is also this:  
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So if having deliberated well is proper to the phronimos, good deliberation [euboulia] seems to be correctness 
about what is convenient with respect to the goal, of which phronēsis is a correct supposition [hupolēpsis] 
(EN.VI.9.1142b31–33) 
 
But the passage is ambiguous: “of which [οὗ]” can be read as referring back to “the goal” (thereby 
supporting intellectualism) or to “what is convenient with respect to the goal”. So an anti-intellectualist 
reading is available. Furthermore, even if we accept that phronēsis is the correct supposition of the goal, 
the meaning of ‘supposition’ [hupolēpsis] must still be specified. Another passage (EE.II.10.1226b20–
30), leads Moss to interpret hupolēpsis as “the recognition that one is working towards a given end” 
(180–182). If so, then phronēsis entails having a correct recognition of one’s goal, but this recognition 
needn’t imply establishing or specifying the goal. 
 
(B) Wish, the rational desire 
Any view that takes goals to be a product of deliberation, or of any kind of logismos, faces the dead-end 
of DL: logismos simply cannot set goals. But intellectualists may take a different route: reason sets goals 
by producing wish, a “a basic, and unreasoned, desire of the reason-possessing part of the soul”.25 
 This intellectualism is more radical than the previous ones, because the specification process depends 
on prior habituated desires, but Grönroos’ wish is rational from the start. 
Aristotle’s texts make the nature of wish far from clear. For one, it is unclear whether it belongs 
in the rational or the non-rational part of the soul.26 However, wish-intellectualism relies more strongly 
                                                
25 Grönroos (62). Cf. Irwin (569–571); Hämäläinen (91–92). 
26 Contrast Top.IV.5.126a13 with Pol.VII.13.1334b17–25. Further, Grönroos takes DA.III.9.432b5-6 as evidence that wish 
belongs to the rational part, and Moss (161–162) takes it as evidence to the contrary! Another passage, that has not been 
discussed in this context, may help: 
 
Since there are two parts of the soul, and the virtues are divided according to them, and some belong to the one 
that has reason and are intellectual (whose function is the truth concerning how things are or how they came to 
be), whereas the others belong to the non-rational part, which has desire [ὄρεξιν] (for not any part of the soul has 
desire, if it is divided in parts), it is necessary for character to be bad or excellent due to pursuing and fleeing from 
certain pleasures and pains. (EE.II.4.1221b27–34) 
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on clearer evidence: Aristotle holds that wishes are for the end as opposed to the things toward the end, 
and that they are for the good as opposed to the apparent good.27 Grönroos constructs an illuminating 
account of wish out of these two elements, but despite its strengths it does not seem sufficient to justify 
intellectualism. 
Wish is a desire for goals rather than for things toward the goals. But which goals is wish for? 
Aristotle says that we wish for many things, e.g. health or victory, and even things that are impossible, 
like immortality, or not achievable by our own action, like success for some actor or athlete 
(EN.III.2.1111b19–26). Despite this variability in its objects, Grönroos convincingly argues that wish 
has one proper object: being a desire for the good, if we take ‘the good’ to mean ‘happiness’ (as it often 
does), the specific object of wish turns out to be human happiness. 
To justify this, Grönroos stresses the distinction between natural and non-natural objects of 
wish, which Aristotle makes in a medicine analogy: the natural goal of medicine is health, even though 
because of a perversion [strophē] it can pursue a goal contrary to nature. “And similarly, also wish is by 
nature for the good, but contrary to nature it is also for the bad, and the good is wished by nature, but 
contrary to nature, due to perversion [diastrophēn] the bad is also wished” (EE.II.10.1227a28-31). 
Thus wish has a ‘natural teleology’: it naturally pursues one object, even if perversions can make it 
pursue others. Further clarification comes from Aristotle’s treatment of a famous puzzle concerning the 
object of wish (EN.III.4): if the object of wish is the good, then people who choose things that are not 
good (e.g. intemperates choosing excessive pleasures) are not really wishing at all; and if wish is for the 
apparent good, then wish has no natural object. To solve this aporia, Aristotle argues that the natural 
object of wish is the good because, although the object of each person’s wish is what appears good to each 
one, in the virtuous person the good and the apparent good coincide (EN.III.4.1113a23–33).  
But how can wish be at the same time only for the good, and also for whatever appears good to 
anyone? Grönroos argues that to clarify this we must distinguish two constitutive elements of wish: as a 
source of motivation, wish naturally aims at the human good; and as containing a representation of the 
good, wish directs the agent toward whatever appears good to her. As a source of motivation, wish is an 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Thus, since not all parts of the soul have desire, and Aristotle divides the soul in only two parts, the passage implicitly denies 
that the rational part has desires. So textual evidence seems to favour placing wish in the non-rational soul. This, however, 
would not settle the debate, since wish is still considered a rational desire, regardless of location. 
27 Wish is a desire for the end: EN.III.2.1111b26-9; III.4.1113a15; III.5.1113b3. Wish (as opposed to appetite and 
spiritedness) is a desire for the good: EN.III.4.1113a15-16; EE.II.10.1227a28-31; Top.VI.8.146b5-6; Rhet.I.10.1369a2-4. 
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originary rational desire for the human good, independent from prior non-rational motivations or prior 
reasoning processes. (This is good news for intellectualism.) However, wish often aims not at the real 
human good, but at other objects because the representation of the good it contains may be perverted. 
Crucially, even when perverted wish leads the agent toward the wrong object, wish is still motivates the 
agent toward the real good (due to its intrinsic motivational nature). The error is representational, not 
motivational. 
What causes this representational error? Since wish-intellectualists construe wish as a 
primordially rational desire, they must argue—as Grönroos indeed does—that reasoning errors produce 
representational errors: if someone has not reached the correct conclusions about the true nature of the 
human good, then she is led to wishing for non-natural objects. But this cannot be correct: mistakes 
about the apparent good are caused not by bad reasoning, but, as DL attests (§2.2.1), by bad 
habituation. Aristotle explicit view is that each agent’s representation (i.e. phantasia) of the good 
originates in habituation processes that determine her experience of objects as worthy of pursuit or of 
avoidance. The EN.III.4 passage is explicit about this: “the fine and pleasant things are proper to each 
character disposition (hexis)”. So the perversion that leads wish to aim at the wrong objects is not due to 
reasoning; the representational content of wish varies according to “each character disposition”, not 
argument.28 Saying otherwise would imply denying DL.29 
Thus, although Grönroos provides powerful evidence that wish is a non-derivative source of 
rational motivation, this remains insufficient to ground the intellectualist view that reason can set an 
agent’s goals, because wish, although motivationally independent, is not representationally independent 
from the non-rational soul. Wish is therefore not a source of rational goal-setting: it is a source of 
                                                
28 Hämäläinen contends that this passage does not establish a causal connection between character and appearance of the 
good. Instead, “Aristotle’s claim may only establish a correlation. He may mean that the better one’s character is, the more 
reliably one’s sensations indicate the goodness of a potential end, although only fully virtuous people discern good ends 
entirely rightly.” (108) This may be true for the passage in question. But Aristotle explicitly states a causal connection in 
other DL passages (see §2.2.1 above and Bermúdez (2016)). 
29 Grönroos holds wish to be a demanding mental state because its object, the human good, is not perceptually immediate, 
and “requires a representation based on reason’s cognitive resources” (82). This strikes me as problematic. Reason may be 
required for a fully-articulated conception of the good; but Aristotle claims wish is at work even before agents have developed 
rational capacities: “spiritedness and wish, as well as appetite, appear in children right from birth, but reasoning and intellect 
develop by nature as they grow older” (Pol.VII.13.1334b20–25). If wish emerges before reason itself develops, then its 
content need not rely on “reason’s cognitive resources”. 
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rational motivation for whatever the agent was habituated into representing as a goal. Character 
determines the content of all desire—even wish. 
Intellectualists may counter that people who were badly habituated, and now misrepresent the 
good, still wish for the real human good and feel inner conflicts due to their apparent good not 
matching the real good.30 
 This may be so, but it still falls short of demonstrating wish-intellectualism, which would 
require reason to provide remorseful vicious people with a character-independent representation of the 
goal. If reason could do this, we would expect to find in Aristotle’s texts cases of reflective conversion, 
in which vicious people correct their representation of the good through philosophy or some other 
rational activity. 
 But such cases are nowhere to be found. What is easily found is Aristotle’s view that only 
properly habituated people can profit from practical reasoning, and that most people listen to their 
passions (like fear and pleasure), but not to reason (EN.X.9.1179b23–31; VII.7.1150a9–16). Thus, “the 
decent person, living with a view to the fine, will listen to reason, whereas the base person, desiring 
pleasure, is to be punished just like a beast of burden” (EN.X.9.1179b31–1180a14). 
So, although there is evidence in favour of the claim that wish is a basic, rational, character-
independent source of motivation, the representational content of wish is provided by character. No 
solid foundation for intellectualism is to be found here. 
 
(C) Practical noūs 
Those who admit there is no deliberation about ends as such, but still want to say grasp of the ends is 
rational, can say that the grasp of the end is an intellectual intuition of the kind Aristotle calls noūs. 
After admitting that there is no deliberation about the ultimate end, and that the grasp of the good 
comes through habituation, Cooper concludes that the virtuous person’s knowledge of the ultimate 
goal “must be a kind of intuitive knowledge, not based on reasons of any kind” (62). However, he 
worries that a phronimos, if questioned about his conception of the good, may be unable to provide an 
articulable justification for it. The virtuous person should be able to argue in favour of his view of the 
                                                
30 Grönroos (79–80) mentions two texts as evidence: Aristotle’s claim that “probably even in base people there is some 
natural good stronger than their own [baseness], which desires for their proper good” (EN.X.2.1173a4-5); and the passage 
that states vicious people have no friendly feelings for themselves, but rather a great remorse due to the strong internal 
conflict between their appetite and their wish (EN.IX.4.1166b7-22). 
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good; but if not through practical reasoning, then what kind of reasoning could he employ? 
Drawing a parallel between the theoretical and practical realms, Cooper argues that dialectic 
may do the job. In the theoretical sciences, dialectic allows for the grasp of a science’s non-
demonstrable first principles. Dialectic argument is more informal than deduction: its raw materials are 
common observation and reputable opinion. Since there is no demonstration of a science’s first 
principles, they are said to be known by noūs, i.e. intellectual intuition.31 Arguably, EN.I is a dialectical 
argument seeking to establish the first principles concerning the human good. If so, the virtuous person 
can justify his views about the good, if not through practical reasoning (i.e. deliberation), then at least 
through dialectic. Thus, practical principles are grasped by noūs, and can be established by dialectical 
argument (60–65). 
Cooper’s interpretation, though compelling, over-stretches intellectualism in one crucial aspect. 
He claims that we grasp the good by intellectual intuition (or noūs), but while the intellect must no 
doubt be involved in dialectical argument, the dialectic concerning the human good does not have 
rational starting points. Recall that, although the EN.I dialectic provides the why concerning the 
human good, only those who already have acquired the what through proper habituation can properly 
grasp it.32 Because the habituated what is a prerequisite for fruitfully engaging in ethical dialectics, 
Cooper’s dialectic justification of intellectualism fails, since it cannot provide evidence that the starting 
points of dialectic itself are grasped intellectually. The only way to argue that this habituation-based 
cognition of the good is intellectual would be to say that habituation itself is an intellectual process of 
some kind. Cooper—and many others—think that this is the case, but that is a separate topic that must 
be considered independently.33 However, given his own theoretical commitments, he should agree that 
the originary grasp of the good is not intellectual. Cooper distinguishes between the question “whether 
for any agent […] the commitment to an ultimate end is based on reasons”, and the question “whether 
or not considerations can be advanced which tend to show that a given end […] is the best end to treat 
as ultimate” (60). Although he gives a positive answer to the second question (dialectical argumentation 
can produce considerations in favour of treating a certain end as ultimate), he thinks Aristotle must 
answer “No” to the first question, precisely because grasp of the ultimate end originates not in 
                                                
31 APo.I.2.71b16–17; I.3.72b18–20; II.19.100b5–15. Consider also Aristotle’s claim that there is noûs, but not logos, of both 
the first and last things (EN.VI.11.1143a35–b5). 
32 EN.I.4.1095b4–8; cf. I.3.1095a2–11. 
33 See Bermúdez (2016). 
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reasoning, but in habituation. Thus, 
 
It is prudent and reasonable, I think, of Aristotle not to insist that ordinary moral agents know, or need to 
know, how to defend their own view of what kind of life is best: their intuitive conviction is a perfectly 
adequate foundation for them. But those dialectical and critically alert persons who are moved to deepen 
their understanding of this foundation can do so by examining, in a dialectical spirit, the deliverances of 
moral intuition. (Cooper 71) 
 
This is perfectly sensible: human agents (even those with a correct grasp of the good) need not have a 
sophisticated theoretical articulation of the good. Having it implies dialectic engagement with the 
subject—but that is an entirely different matter from having a habituated grasp of the what. So 
although the why provides an intellectual grasp of the good, its foundation, the what, is a non-
intellectual grasp of the good. 
 
3. Assessing anti-intellectualism about human agency 
If available intellectualist interpretations cannot account for the textual evidence, does anti-
intellectualism fare any better? This part presents (3.1) the arguments for anti-intellectualism raised by 
its most prominent advocate, Jessica Moss, who reads Aristotle as a “practical empiricist”. Despite its 
strengths, I argue that (3.2) anti-intellectualism fails to account for the priority of reason over desire 
that Aristotle states explicitly.  
 
3.1. Aristotle as a practical empiricist: Moss’s anti-intellectualism 
Through a careful analysis of the division of labour passages, and of the role of phantasia in practical 
cognition, Moss argues that Aristotle endorses a form of “practical empiricism”: all the contents of 
practical thought come originally from sense-perception processes. Every object of wish, deliberation, 
and any other rational process originates in prior perceptual experience. Specifically—and following the 
analogy between theoretical and practical reasoning proposed in some of the DL passages—, just like 
theoretical principles are presupposed by reasoning, similarly the practical principles are established 
perceptually (or quasi-perceptually via phantasia). 
Practical empiricism entails that reasoning is constrained by earlier non-rational processes of 
perception and habituation: “On an empiricist epistemology like this, one will not come to […] make 
intellectual judgments about goodness which apply to things radically different from things one has 
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actually pleasurably perceived, because it is those things which inform the concept” (Moss 234). This 
view can easily accommodate DL and its consequences. But Moss goes several steps further: since 
“reason does not rule in us as an independent force inserted as it were from above”, but instead “is 
dependent on non-rational cognition, both in genesis and in operation” (235), we must demote its 
relevance as a psychological force, acknowledging the primacy of non-rational forms of cognition. 
This apparently turns Aristotle’s moral psychology into a kind of Humeanism: reasoning is not 
in control of volitions, but rather volitions control the cognitive faculty. Moss recognizes this as 
problematic, so she resists the inference: “Aristotle can hold a Humean view of practical reasoning as 
restricted to working out “things towards ends,” while still holding the very un-Humean view that we 
want our ends because we find them good, for his claim is that we find them good through phantasia” 
(Moss 159–160). Her view is thus that practical cognition still rules over desire and the passions, 
because the latter are determined by phantasia, which, though non-rational, is still a form of cognition 
(§1.1). So goals are not blindly determined by desires.  
There are two key claims of practical empiricism:  
 
(PE1) Humeanism about reason 
Practical reason is restricted to working out the things relative to the ends that are established via 
perception, quasi-perceptual phantasia, and habituation. 
 
(PE2) Non-Humeanism about cognition 
Goal-setting depends on phantasia, a non-rational kind of cognition. 
 
These claims are meant to strike the proper balance between character’s goal-setting function and the 
dominance of practical cognition over desire. Does practical empiricism succeed? 
 
3.2. The problem with anti-intellectualism: the priority of reason 
Any intellectualist would certainly be upset about the minimal role Moss gives reason in the 
constitution of goals. And rightly so, because key aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine remain unaccounted 
for. Consider Aristotle’s claim that the nonrational soul “participates somehow” in reason, “insofar as it 
listens to it and obeys it”. 
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Also, correction and every punishment and exhortation reveal that the non-rational [part] is somehow 
persuaded by reason. And if it is necessary to say that this [part] has reason too, two [parts] will have 
reason: one will have it properly and in itself, and the other will have it in a way, by listening to it like a 
father. (EN.I.13.1102b30–1103a3; cf. EE.II.1.1219b29-1220a2) 
 
So the non-rational part must listen to reason’s ‘parental’ commands. This is a widespread hierarchical 
view, according to which the soul’s rational part should govern the appetitive part. Reason also 
sometimes plays other caregiving roles: “as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, 
so the appetitive element should live according to reason”.34 Aristotle also clearly considers reason the 
best part of our nature, and thinks that it should therefore be the commanding force.35 This seems to 
counter the view of reason as nothing but an intermediary between character-established desire and 
action. For if reason cannot determine goals, but is rather constrained by them, reason seems to be 
obeying desire, not the other way around.  
Moreover, the worry about what the Ethics and political science in general are for remains. 
Aristotle’s ethical project is undoubtedly a rational study of the human telos, and he is quite explicit that 
we study ethics “not so that we may know what virtue is, but so that we may become good” 
(EN.II.2.1103b27–8; cf. EE.I.5.1216b16–25). How can we become good by studying ethics, if 
reasoning cannot contribute to shaping our goals? 
These are both important concerns.36 Given the textual evidence, Aristotle clearly holds 
something like the following:  
 
(PR) The Priority of Reason 
The human soul’s rational part must guide the non-rational part, and the non-rational part must in turn 
listen to reason. Reason should prescribe, character should follow. 
 
Moss’ practical empiricism is unable to accommodate PR. The reason is not that PE1 is too Humean, 
taking too much away from reason (PE1 merely restates DL). The problem is rather that PE2 is not 
sufficiently non-Humean, not cognitive enough. 
                                                
34 EN.III.12.1119b3–18. Cf. IX.4.1166a13–14; EE.II.1.1219b29-1220a2; Pol.I.5.1254a33–34; b3–6;VII.15.1334b15–17. 
35 E.g. EN.VI.13.1145a6–11; X.7.1177a12–17; Pol.VII.15.1334b22–28. 
36 Both taken to support intellectualism (Hämäläinen 108). 
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To avoid conflating Aristotle and Hume, Moss claims that Aristotle would have phantasia rule 
over the passions, instead of the passions rule over cognition. That much is certainly correct: the 
cognition of an object as good or bad (via perception or phantasia) sets the faculty of desire in motion 
(§1.1). However, this non-rational cognitivism is inconsistent with PR, which states that reason (not 
non-rational cognition) prescribes over desire. 
Moss may contend that PR cannot represent Aristotle’s view, since practical reason’s activities 
are effectively constrained by the contents of the agent’s phantasiai, which are in turn determined by her 
prior habituation and perceptual experiences. This has to be accepted as well, for its rejection over-
intellectualizes the starting points of human action (§2.2.2). But we must also be careful not to under-
intellectualize Aristotle’s view: for if, as Moss says, reason is fully “dependent on non-rational cognition, 
both in genesis and operation”, it follows that character prescribes, and reason must follow character’s 
prescriptions. Thus reason becomes a slave, not to the passions, but to non-rational cognition. This 
practical-empiricist position, while more cognitivist than radical Humeanism, is still not intellectual 
enough for PR. For, according to Moss (140), 
 
practical intellect does quite a bit less […] than is widely thought. We are indeed able, in virtue of our 
rationality, to have cognitions about the good, and corresponding motivations, that are unavailable to lower 
creatures. But this is not so much a matter of grasping distinctive content as a matter of manipulating and 
conceptualizing content in sophisticated ways. The content of our thoughts about the good […] is 
determined by non-rational cognition: by evaluative perception and phantasia, the cognitive capacities of 
the non-rational soul. 
 
There is much truth in this. But it cannot be the whole truth, since Aristotle still considers reason the 
most important, and therefore ruling, element. Which highlights the ultimate problem for interpreting 
Aristotle’s agency theory: we must make the view that only character establishes the goals (DL) 
compatible with the claim that reason must prescribe and character must follow (PR). Intellectualism 
fails by disregarding DL, and anti-intellectualism fails by disregarding PR, despite solid textual 
evidence for both claims. How are we to make progress in this situation? 
 
4. Conclusion: Toward indirect intellectualism 
If the two traditional interpretive approaches are flawed, it is time to try something different. The key 
intuition for a new approach is that reason cannot set the goals of action directly (that is character’s 
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role), but it may be able to set goals indirectly, by shaping character. This is indirect intellectualism, a 
view that seeks to preserve the virtues of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism while avoiding 
their pitfalls. Indirect intellectualism has two main claims: 
 
[I.I.1] The care of one’s self: Action as practice 
Reason can set the goals of action indirectly, by carefully shaping character through the practice of 
appropriate actions. 
 
[I.I.2] The care of others as a precondition for individual self-care 
Reason can set the goals of action indirectly only in a political context in which individuals receive proper 
care for the development of their character from early childhood.  
 
I.I.1 makes DL and PR consistent: since—as Aristotle often claims—a certain kind of action generates 
the corresponding kind of character disposition, agents can rationally establish their goals indirectly, by 
treating each action as practice toward their desired character. If reason succeeds in sculpting character, 
then it will succeed in (indirectly) determining the agent’s goals. 
But I.I.1 cannot be the whole answer, for it presupposes two things: first, that the given 
individual already has the desire to attain a certain character. And second, that this individual already is 
the kind of person who can design and execute a rational plan of long-term, effortful character 
construction; but this is possible only for persons who are already rational, i.e. who do not allow their 
immediate affections to deviate them from their rational plan. In short, I.I.1 presupposes that people 
are already able to care for themselves. But, as mentioned above, Aristotle claims many fail to satisfy 
these presuppositions, unable to properly care for their own characters, simply living in accordance with 
their immediate passions (EN.X.9.1179b23–31). So how do people get to that point (i.e. the point of 
having the desire to care for ourselves, and of being able to devise and execute a long-term rational 
plan)?  
This is where I.I.2 comes in. Reason can take control of an agent’s goals as long as the agent 
herself has been properly habituated “straight from birth”.37 Such early habituation initiates the agent 
into a way of life that allows her later to take habituation into her own hands, by rationally developing 
the character that will make her pursue certain goals and avoid others. This is how reason can set goals: 
                                                
37 EN.II.1.1103b21–25; cf. II.2. 
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not directly, by means of reasoning (this is impossible given DL), but indirectly, via habituation and 
careful character formation (which secures PR without denying DL). 
For reasons of space, the details of indirect intellectualism must be developed elsewhere.38 My 
goal here has been to show that the traditional interpretative fail to consistently accommodate both DL 
and PR. This discussion opens the path toward a novel interpretation of the interplay between 
character and reason in Aristotle’s theory of human agency. 
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